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The Third Strike: United States' Attempts at Achieving
Tax Parity Between its Income Tax and the European
Value-Added Tax
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 2000, the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Appellate Body
upheld a dispute resolution panel's determination that the tax exemptions and deferrals
available to United States (U.S.) exporters through the foreign sales corporation (FSC)
regime constitute illegal export subsidies under the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) 1 and Agreement on Agriculture (AA). 2
The FSC legislation attempted to achieve tax parity between contrasting systems of
taxation: the extraterritorial income tax and the value-added tax (VAT). The VAT, the
predominant system worldwide, imposes a tax on the consumption of goods. Thus,
companies do not pay taxes on the income earned from exports. In contrast, the U.S.
adheres to an extraterritorial income tax approach whereby the U.S. entity incurs tax
liability on income earned worldwide. In an attempt to equalize these systems, the U.S.
enacted the FSC legislation in 1984, allowing companies to exclude or defer taxation on
a portion of the FSC's income derived from exports.
In accordance with the determination of the Appellate Body that the FSC regime is
prohibited, the U.S. was required to modify the offending provisions to make them
WTO-compliant. On November 15, 2000, President Clinton signed the FSC Repeal and
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000,4 which "modified the taxation of foreign
trade income to comply with the standards set forth in the decisions of the WTO dispute
panel and the Appellate Body.",5 To ensure WTO compatibility, the new tax structure
cannot confer export-contingent benefits. However, the new legislation fails to accom-
plish this crucial requirement.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE WTO AS A LEGAL STRUCTURE
From 1947 to 1994, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a
1. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 264 (1994).
2. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 14, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex IA, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE LEGAL TEXTS 39 (1994).
3. 26 U.S.C. §§ 921-927 (1994).
4. H.R. 4986.
5. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 106th Cong., FSC REPEAL AND EXTRATERRITORIAL
INCOME EXCLUSION ACT OF 2000 106-416 (Sept. 20, 2000) (hereinafter SENATE REPORT).
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provisional agreement comprised of trade rules and tariff concessions to guide much of
the world's trade in goods. The GATT was "formed in a context of largely state-
managed economics, where disputes would involve challenges to the exercise of gov-
ernmental regulatory endowments and would be resolved through a process of bargain-
ing that reflected respective power and the availability of bargaining gains." 6 Provisions
in the GATT called for a dispute resolution panel to resolve differences among signato-
ries. The determinations of the GATT panel were merely advisory, as either party to a
dispute could prevent their adoption. Nonetheless, the GATT opinions were frequently
understood as conclusive explanations of GATT obligations.
7
For fifty years, a series of eight trade rounds concentrated on developing and en-
hancing the GATT and its obligations. After seven years of arduous bargaining culmi-
nating on December 15, 1993, the Uruguay Round resulted in the most ambitious global
trade reform since the creation of the GATT. This reform resulted in the reconstitution
of the GATT obligations under the newly-formed WTO and the creation of additional
agreements with provisions for opening trade in the intellectual property and services
areas.
Once a member of the WTO, a nation agrees to adhere to certain fundamental prin-
ciples. Through these principles, the WTO advocates that the trading system should be
without discrimination, freer, predictable, more competitive, and more beneficial for less
developed countries. 8 These principles are the basic elements of a WTO dispute resolu-
tion decision.
With respect to trade without discrimination, WTO members agree to adhere to two
fundamental principles: the most favored nation principle,9 stating that a country should
not discriminate between its trading partners, and the national treatment principle,' 0
stating that a country should not discriminate between domestic and foreign products,
services, or nationals once across the customs frontier. Limited exceptions are allowed,
such as adherence to specific free trade agreements or the imposition of countervailing
duties. "
The WTO advocates freer trade to be achieved "gradually, through negotiation" and
"progressive liberalization."' 2 It is important that member states bind themselves to the
WTO agreements since doing so "is an attempt by governments to make the business
6. Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The U.S. and the World Trade Organization, I CHICAGO J.
INTL. L. 49,51 (2000).
7. See id.
8. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-w/whatis-eltif e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2001).
9. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Art.
1 (1958) (text of agreement in effect in 1958) (hereinafter GATT).
10. See, e.g., id. at Art. 3.





environment stable and predictable."'1 3 Predictability encourages investment, which
increases employment and, according to the WTO theory, provides consumers with
choices and lower prices. 14 Transparency promotes predictability, meaning that any
obstacles to trade should be evident so that trading partners can work around them. The
WTO adheres to the classical view in that freer trade also contributes to Third World
development.
Importantly, the WTO is not a "free trade" institution - the complicated system of
agreements clearly allows for various forms of protectionism. The baseline concept of
the WTO is that it advocates fair competition and aims to develop a "system of rules
dedicated to open, fair, and undistorted competition. ' 5 .In that regard, export subsidies
are an example of protectionist trade policies that are disallowed because they subvert
the general principles of the WTO.
Export subsidies are financial or other incentives that stimulate exports. Article
XVI:2 of the GATr states that "contracting parties recognize that the granting by a con-
tracting party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects for
other contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may cause undue disturbance to
their normal commercial interests, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of
this Agreement."'1
6
Export subsidies encourage exports by reducing the costs of production for exports
below the costs of production for the domestic market (all else equal). Export subsidies,
however, can adversely affect income distribution in the importing country. By lowering
the price of the good to consumers, export subsidies can harm labor and capital in the
competing local industries. The same can happen with third-country suppliers as well,
the industries of which might compete with the exports in the importing country. Thus,
the distortion caused by export subsidies is believed to cause economic inefficiency that
inhibits worldwide market stability and Third World development.
III. TAXATION AS AN EXPORT SUBSIDY UNDER THE GATT
Article XVI:4 of the GATT prohibits the use of subsidies to stimulate exports: con-
tracting parties "shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on
the export of any product ... [that] results in the sale of such product for export at a
price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the do-
mestic market."' 7 More specifically, Article 1. l(a)(1) of the SCM states that a subsidy is
deemed to exist where "government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not




16. GATT, Art. XVI:3.
17. GATT, Art. XVI:4.
18. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 1.1 (a)(1).
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in law or in fact, . .. upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex l."' 9
Annex 1 of the SCM provides an illustrative example of an export subsidy as "the full or
partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or
social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises."2
A tax exemption is not always an illegal export subsidy. A tax exemption that satis-
fies two criteria complies with WTO/GATT obligations: 1) the tax exemption must be
one of the "indirect" taxes specified in the SCM; and 2) the tax exemption affiliated
with exports cannot be greater than the amount levied on the goods sold domestically.21
A. Indirect Tax Requirement
The GATT differentiates between a direct and indirect tax, and it allows a remission
or exemption of indirect tax but not of direct tax. Direct taxes are those imposed on a
person or corporation. An example is an income tax. In contrast, indirect taxes are those
levied on the goods themselves. An example of an indirect tax is the VAT through
which a tax is imposed on the value added to the product at successive stages of produc-
tion. An interpretive note to Article XVI states that "[tJhe exemption of an exported
product from duties or taxes borne by the product when destined for domestic consump-
tion, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which
have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.",22 In combination with the illustra-
tive example in Annex 1 of the SCM described above (that the exemption from "direct
taxes" is a subsidy), the statement "borne by the product" supports the direct/indirect tax
distinction in the GATT. Thus, it appears that the GATT permits the remission or ex-
emption of indirect taxes.23 On the other hand, governments may not exempt exporters
from a direct tax. According to an interpretive report by a GATT working party, ex-
empting or deferring the payment of direct tax from exporters would be considered an
impermissible subsidy. 24 As a result, a member country is prohibited from using tax
exemptions from or deferrals of an income tax to foster exports.
Traditional economic theory predicts that a general percentage tax on economic
profits will have no effect on price or output; and, therefore, the full incidence of such a
tax will fall on producers. Theoretically, the distinction between direct and indirect taxes
in the GATT is based on this assumption. It assumes that producers will shift the cost of
the indirect tax forward as a component of the price of the good, added in their entirety
19. Id. at Art. 3.1 (a).
20. Id. at Annex 1.
21. Stephen E. Shay and Victoria P. Summers, Selected International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Re-
form Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1049 (July, 1997).
22. GATT, Annex 1, Notes and Supplementary Provisions.
23. See Ronald Sernau, Note: The Foreign Sales Corporation Legislation: A $10 Billion Boondoggle, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1183 (Sept. 1986).
24. Subsidies: Report Adopted 19 November 1960, GATT Doc. U1381 reprinted in GATT BISD, at
185-86 (9th Supp. 1961).
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to the consumer's cost of the good, whereas the same forward-shifting will not occur
with direct taxes because they are paid at the source, most likely out of profit. Since they
are paid out of profit, the theory concludes, direct taxes do not affect the final price of
the product.25 The consequence follows that only indirect taxes raise the domestic price
and place local producers on an unfavorable competitive footing compared with foreign
producers with a direct tax system. As a result, the indirect taxes require an adjustment,
which is the function of the VAT rebate for exported goods.
The direct and indirect distinction in the GATT is artificial. Income tax may be
shifted to the consumer in exactly the same degree as the VAT tax. Producers have
highly accurate cost profit projections and can easily anticipate what the tax liability will
be. Taxes, as a predictable cost of production, are certain and can be incorporated into
the price of the goods as easily as marketing, wages, insurance, and other production
costs.
A possible exception is an industry in perfect competition, where the increase in
cost would raise the producer's supply curve above a profitable demand price; consum-
ers will flock to other suppliers and the producer with the higher prices will be forced to
lower prices or to go out of business. However, perfectly competitive markets are nearly
impossible to achieve because they require perfect information. The absence of perfect
information means that reality will always fall short of the perfectly competitive theo-
retical ideal. Even assuming the perfectly competitive theoretical ideal, however, taxes
will be factored in as a cost of production and every producer will raise the price by the
amount of the tax in the long run.
B. No Excess Tax Rebates for Exports
Similar to the national treatment principle, this second requirement means tax re-
bates from exports shall not exceed the tax levied on domestically-produced or imported
goods. For example, a prohibited export subsidy would be the "exemption or remission
in respect of the production and distribution of exported products of indirect taxes in
excess of those levied in respect of the production and distribution of like products when
sold for domestic consumption. 26 The VAT complies with this requirement.
IV. THE FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION STRUCTURE
A. Evolution of the FSC from the Domestic International Sales Corporation
In 1971, Congress enacted the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC)
25. See Semau, supra note 23, at 1183.
26. Victoria P. Summers, The Border Adjustability of Consumption Taxes, Existing and Proposed, 12
TAX NOTES INT'L 1793, 1795 n. 9 (June 3, 1996). See also Shay and Summers, supra note 2 1, at 1049 n. 90.
20011],
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provisions as an incentive to foreign export. 27 A DISC was "a domestic 'paper' corpora-
tion through which its American exporting parent channels export income,, 28 the over-
arching purpose of which was to "remov[e] discrimination against those who export
through U.S. corporations., 29 In enacting the DISC, "Congress accepted the modern
view that no appreciable difference exists between the impact of direct and indirect taxes
on prices [and] designed the DISC legislation's benefits to equalize American exporters
with foreign counterparts exporting from countries providing indirect tax refunds and
exemptions.,
30
Once certified as a DISC,3' a company was allowed to follow an alternate, and
favorable, tax regime that allowed a certain portion of the DISC's income to be non-
taxable (or at least deferred). The DISC structure allowed a fixed percentage of the
DISC's income to be treated as if earned by the parent corporation (and thus was tax-
able), but the remaining income was treated as offshore income, free from tax until repa-
triated through dividends. 32 The underlying purpose of the DISC was to "mimic what
happens under a consumption tax: revenue from export sales does not enter into the tax
base."33
The DISC structure disturbed the members of the GATT who traded with the U.S.
The European Economic Community (EEC, precursor to the European Community)
convened a GATT panel challenging this system.34 The EEC asserted that the DISC
structure was effectively an illegal export trade subsidy that permitted indefinite deferral
of direct taxes on income earned in the U.S. from exports. This deferral was, the EEC
alleged, equivalent to an exemption of direct taxation. The U.S., on the other hand, ar-
27. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 53553 (1971) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§§ 991-997 (1982 & Supp. 1111985)).
28. Sernau, supra note 23, at n.2.
29. Id. at 1185, citing S. REP. No. 437, 92dCong., lstSess. 90 (1971).
30. Id., citing John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT, 72
AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 750-51 (1978).
31. The main requirement is that the company seeking qualification as a DISC must be a wholly-owned
subsidiary incorporated in the U.S. with the sole function of selling the parent company's goods overseas. See
I.R.C. § 992(a)(1)(A)-(C) (1982 and Supp. III 1985).
32. Income earned by a foreign corporation from its foreign operations generally is subject to U.S.
tax only when such income is distributed to any U.S. persons that hold stock in such corpora-
tion. Accordingly, a U.S. person that conducts foreign operations though a foreign corpora-
tion generally is subject to U.S. tax on the income from those operations when the income is
repatriated to the United States through a dividend distribution to the U.S. person. The in-
come is reported on the U.S. person's tax return for the year the distribution is received, and
the United States imposes a tax on such income at that time.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 5.
33. Stephan, supra note 6, at 62.
34. United States Tax Legislation (DISC), GATT BISD 23A/98 (1976). The EEC relied on
Article XXIII of the GATT:
If any contracting party believes a benefit it should get under GATT has been 'nulli
fled or impaired' as a result of another contracting party's breach of another meas-
ure, then it may seek consultation and if that fails, the complainant may ask the ple-
nary GATT body to authorize suspension of GATT obligations as a response.
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gued to the GATT Council that the tax advantages accrued under the VAT's territorial-
ity principle constitute an export subsidy because they have the same economic effect as
any other export subsidy.35
Ruling on the dispute, the GATT panel determined that a signatory is not allowed to
deviate from its normal pattern of income tax rules simply for the benefit of exporting
companies.36 Following the GATI decision, the U.S. and the EEC continued negotiating
the use of tax benefits to stimulate exports in the Tokyo Round and reached an under-
standing that they incorporated into the 1979 Subsidies Code. The parties delayed adop-
tion of the panel report until 1981, and then imposed a significant modification on the
panel findings. Supposedly following the understanding achieved through the U.S. and
EEC negotiations, the GATT Council announced that:
[I]n general, economic processes (including transactions involving exported goods)
located outside the territorial limits of the exporting country need not be subject to
taxation by the exporting country and should not be regarded as export activities in
terms of Article XVI:4 of the General Agreement. It is further understood that Article
XVI:4 requires that arms-length pricing be observed, i.e., prices for goods in transac-
tions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or the same control
should for tax purposes be the prices which would be charged between independent
enterprises acting at arm's length. Furthermore, Article XVI:4 does not prohibit the
adoption of measures to avoid double taxation of foreign source income."
37
After the modified Council decision, the U.S. did not formally concede that the
DISC regime contravened the GATT's foundational policies. Perceiving the statements
of the GATT Council, above, to be an authoritative interpretation of the GATT,38 the
Reagan administration proposed substituting the FSC for the DISC to placate U.S. trad-
ing partners.39 Congress subsequently developed a formula that attempted to evade the
problematic details of the DISC while incorporating a favorable tax regime for exporting




38. See General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 Prepared
by the Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation (1985) (stating that the FSC legislation is "intended to comply
with GATT's requirement[s]"). In addition, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky stated that "[tihe
FSC legislation was enacted expressly to conform to an understanding reached 17 years ago in the GATT
which articulated the proper relationship between different systems of taxation and international trade rules."
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release, July 2, 1998. Commenting on the adverse FSC ruling
by the Appellate Body, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative stated that it is still the understanding of
the U.S. that these principles did not expire with the reconstitution of the GATT but instead are reflected in the
current WTO Subsidies Agreement. USTR Press Release, Feb 24, 2000.
39. "The Administration believes that enactment of... [FSC legislation] is essential if we are ... ever to
make progress toward resolving one of our longest outstanding trade disputes." Foreign Sales Corporation
Act; Hearings on S. 1804 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1984) (prepared




Congress thus created the FSC structure in 1984,40 whereby a portion of the income
earned by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation engaged in minimal economic ac-
tivity4 1 could be exempted from U.S. income tax until repatriated back to the U.S. parent
corporation as dividend income. The FSC structure was an attempt to offset the per-
ceived disadvantages to exporters of an income tax regime compared to a consumption-
based structure and to comply with GATT obligations. Under these guidelines, the re-
placing regime "must (1) be GAT7 consistent; (2) be revenue neutral; (3) maintain the
same level of benefit for U.S. exporters as existed under the DISC. 42
B. Overview of the FSC Structure
An FSC is a foreign corporation set up by a U.S. parent to handle the export activi-
ties of the parent. The FSC must have a genuine foreign presence and its income must
be attributable to substantial commercial activity outside the U.S. 43 It must be incorpo-
rated in a foreign jurisdiction that is party to a "satisfactory" exchange of information
agreement with the U.S. or that is a U.S. possession (other than Puerto Rico); the FSC
must also maintain an office with "permanent books of account." 44 An FSC is not ex-
empt from traditional transfer pricing requirements in that its income must be derived
from an appropriate transfer pricing methodology under either I.R.C. § 482 or adminis-
trative rules.45
Only the "foreign trade income" of an FSC will be subject to the favorable FSC tax-
ing rules, potentially exempt from U.S. income. 46 Income is considered to be "foreign
trade income" when: (1) the income is export-related; (2) the FSC is managed outside
the U.S.; 47 and (3) the economic activities generating the FSC's income occur outside
40. Congress created the FSC as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat.
494 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Division A of the Act is the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
Title VII of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 includes the FSC legislation. Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 801-805, 98
Stat. 985-1103 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (Supp. III 1985)).
41. Generally, the U.S. does not tax the income of a foreign corporation earned outside the U.S.; how-
ever, if income is "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States," then
this foreign-source income will be considered taxable under U.S. tax law to the extent not credited with respect
to foreign income taxes paid on that income. 26 US.C. §. 882(a).
42. Foreign Sales Corporation Act; Hearings on S. 1804 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 61, 62 (1984) (prepared statement by Robert E. Lightizer).
43. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a).
44. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(l)(A), (D).
45. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 922. Note that the benefit of a FSC to the U.S. parent is reduced if the jurisdiction in
which the FSC is located requires income tax to be paid by the FSC. Although a tax credit is given for foreign
income taxes paid by a foreign entity subject to U.S. income tax, the thrust of the FSC legislation is to exempt
the foreign-source income from as much taxation as possible. Therefore, FSCs are likely located in non-tax or
low-tax jurisdictions, such as the U.S. Virgin Islands, which was one of the first jurisdictions to pass special
legislation exempting foreign trade income from local taxation.
47. 26 U.S.C. §§ 924(b)(l)(A) and 927(d)(3).
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the U.S. 4 8 This foreign trade income is treated as foreign source income that is not "ef-
fectively connected with a trade or business in the United States. 49 This foreign source
income is reduced by the FSC's deductions; such deductions are not allowed to offset
the U.S. parent's income for purposes of U.S. income tax. Examples of transactions that
generate foreign trade income for an FSC are: the sale, lease, or rental of export prop-
erty;50 services related and subsidiary to such a sale, lease, or rental of export property;
engineering and architectural services for projects outside the U.S.; and export manage-
ment services.5'
If export property is sold to an FSC by a related entity, the income allocated be-
tween the FSC and the related entity must be computed based on a transfer price deter-
mined under section 482 or one of two administrative pricing formulas. The exempt
portion of the FSC's income depends on the pricing rule used to derive the total income
of the FSC. If the FSC's income is calculated through the arm's-length transfer pricing
methodologies of section 482, then thirty percent of the FSC's gross foreign trade in-
come is exempt, subject to the FSC's deductions. 52 If, on the other hand, the FSC's in-
come is determined by an administrative pricing rule, fifteen percent of the combined
foreign trade income of the FSC and its parent is exempt from U.S. taxation.53 The latter
formulation is complicated, but it derives from the original DISC calculations.
Conceptually, the exempt foreign trade income of an FSC is not taxed in the U.S.
because it is not sufficiently connected with the activities of a trade or business in the
U.S.54 Therefore, the net earnings derived from that exempt foreign trade income may
be distributed tax-free to the U.S. parent.
55 The remaining income is taxable.
56
In addition to treating a portion of the export income of an FSC as exempt from
federal income tax, the FSC legislation also allowed the U.S. parent corporation a sig-
nificant deduction for a portion of the dividends distributed from the FSC back to the
parent. Thus, there is no corporate level tax imposed on a portion of the income from
exports.5 7 Estimates of the tax benefits to exporters under the FSC regime are approxi-
48. 26 U.S.C. § 924(b)(l)(B).
49. 26 U.S.C. § 882(a).
50. Export-related property is "property manufactured or produced in the United States by a person other
than the FSC, sold or leased by or to a FSC for use, consumption, or disposition outside the United States, and
of which no more than 50 per cent of its fair market value is attributable to imports." 26 U.S.C. § 927(a).
Forms of intellectual property, oil and gas products, and "property in short supply" are excluded from the
definition of export-related property. 26 U.S.C. § 927(a)(2).
51. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 5.
52. 26 U.S.C. §§ 923(a)(2) and 921(b).
53. 26 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(3), 921(b), and 925(a)(2).
54. 26 U.S.C. § 921(a). See also 26 U.S.C. § 882(a), stating the prevailing policy that foreign source in-
come is taxed in the U.S. if there is a sufficient connection with a "trade or business within the United States."
55. 26 U.S.C. § 245(c).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 921(d).
57. General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 Prepared by the
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation (1985).
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mately $ 4.5 billion.5 8
V. THE VALUE-ADDED TAX REGIME
International practice is to rely on a mixture of income- and consumption-based
taxes. The VAT falls within the latter category. Most countries that are members of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) rely more heavily
on the consumption-based taxation as a percentage of total tax revenue than on the taxa-
tion of income.5 9 With the exception of the U.S. and Australia, all of the OECD coun-
tries have national-level general consumption taxes in the form of credit-invoice
VATs. 60 Worldwide, seventy-five percent of other countries use the credit-invoice VAT
system.
61
The usual VAT is an indirect tax imposed on each sale beginning at the start of the
production and distribution cycle and culminating with the sale to the customer. All the
sellers in the chain collect the VAT from the purchasers at the time of sale, deduct from
this amount any VAT they themselves have paid on the purchase, and remit the balance
to the government. The net effect of offsetting purchasers and sales is to impose the tax
at each stage of production on the sum of wages, interest, rents, profits, and other factors
of production not furnished by suppliers subject to the tax at the previous stage of pro-
duction. Thus, it is a tax on the "value added' to the good. In other words, the tax is
levied directly on products, and only indirectly shifts to individuals. When a product is
exported from a country using the VAT system, the country rebates the VAT to the ex-
porter. GATI permits the rebate based on the supposed economic difference in forward-
shifting between direct and indirect taxation described previously.
The tax advantage to exporters under the VAT system, compared to U.S. exporters,
depends at least in large part to whether the VAT countries also impose a direct tax sys-
tem. The imposition of income taxes could offset the exporters' advantage as long as the
distinction between direct and indirect taxation prevails in the GATT.
As mentioned above, the U.S. argued to the GATT Council that the tax advantages
accrued under the VAT's territoriality principle constitute an export subsidy. The re-
sponse of the EEC was textual and technical and did not dispute the economic principles
underlying the argument that GATT Article XVI:4 allowed territorial tax systems based
on indirect taxation and thus the economic similarities of the territorial tax regime and
58. This is the amount that the EU seeks to impose in retaliatory trade sanctions against the U.S. 17
I.T.R. 1764, (BNA) Nov. 23, 2000. See also Semau, supra note 23, at n. 78, estimating the tax savings as $ 9
to $ 13 billion.
59. See Shay and Summers, supra note 21, at 1066, citing Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Coun-
tries, 1965-1993, OECD (1994), reprinted in Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 104th Cong., Description and
Analysis of Proposals to Replace the Federal Income Tax, 82 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep, (CCH) No. 29 (June 15,
1995).




export subsidies was irrelevant.62 The GATT panel determined that either tax regime is
permissible; however, the panel held that neither tax regime can be manipulated to meet
the needs of the exporters. Once manipulated for the benefit of exporters, it becomes a
subsidy in violation of the GATT obligations.
It seems that both arguments of the U.S. and EEC are correct, but they cannot
peacefully co-exist. Although Article XVI:4 does support the territoriality principle and
the system of exemption of exporters from indirect taxation, the economic advantages of
the territoriality principle do constitute export subsidies in that they provide export-
contingent financial incentives. The tricky part for the U.S. is that, given a textual read-
ing of GATT Article XVI:4, such "export subsidies" are legal under GATT and any
attempt to circumvent the inherent economic benefits from within an extraterritorial
system applying direct, i.e., income, taxation must fail because it explicitly gives a fi-
nancial advantage based merely on export functions.
VI. THE WTO FSC DISPUTE: APPELLATE BODY DETERMINATION
On November 18, 1997, the European Union (EU) requested the establishment of a
dispute panel to hear its complaint that the FSC structure violates U.S. obligations under
the WTO. The EU alleged that the FSC provisions violated both the SCM and the AA as
a prohibited export subsidy and a prohibited import substitution subsidy. The Panel
agreed with the EU and held that the FSC structure tax exemption violated Article 3. 1(a)
of the SCM and Articles 3.3 and 8 of the AA as an illegal export subsidy.
63
The U.S. appealed the panel decision to the Appellate Body, based on "multiple le-
gal errors on both substantive and procedural issues." 64 The Appellate Body upheld the
panel decision.6 5
A. Disputed Issues
The U.S. urged the Appellate Body to consider the historical background to this dis-
pute, claiming that "the FSC measure.., can be understood only in the context of basic
tax principles, the application of those principles through the FSC measure, and the
historical events that led to the creation of the FSC regime" 66 Specifically, "the FSC
provisions 'were intended to provide a limited territorial-type system of taxation' for
United States exports that complied with GATT subsidy rules."
67
62. Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72
MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1484 (June, 1988).
63. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Tax Treatment for "For-
eign Sales Corporations," WT/DS 108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), 2(a), (b) (hereinafter Appellate Body Re-
port).
64. USTR Press Release, October 28, 1999.




Journal of Legislation [Vol. 27:2
According to the Appellate Body, "the issue in dispute is whether, having decided
to tax a particular category of foreign-source income, namely, foreign-source income
that is 'effectively connected with a trade or business within the United States,' the
United States is permitted to carve out an export contingent exemption from the cate-
gory of foreign-source income that is taxed under its other rules of taxation. 68 The
Appellate Body's clear answer was a resounding no.
69
1. Arguments by the United States - Appellant
In this appeal, the U.S. contested the Panel's interpretation of footnote 5970 of the
SCM as well as the GATT Council's 1981 "understanding.,
71
a. Footnote 59 of the SCM
The U.S. "considers that footnote 59 permits tax exemptions for foreign-source in-
come even if it is 'specifically in relation to exports.' 72 The U.S. claimed that footnote
59 qualifies the Illustrative List characterizing certain tax practices as export subsidies
so that the FSC regime is exempted from being an export subsidy. In particular, the U.S.
makes two arguments regarding footnote 59: First, the second sentence of footnote 59,
which affirms the arm's length principle, "assumes that foreign-source income may be
exempted from tax or taxed to a lesser extent than domestic-source income, and would
have no meaning if foreign-source income could not be exempted from tax. 73 Secondly,
the fifth sentence of footnote 59, which excludes measures taken to avoid double taxa-
68. Id. 99 (emphasis in original).
69. See id.
70. The full text of footnote 59 is as follows:
The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy where, for
example, appropriate interest charges are collected. The Members reaffirm the prin-
ciple that prices for goods in transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign
buyers under their or under the same control should for tax purposes be prices which
would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm's length. Any Mem-
ber may draw the attention of another Member to administrative or other practices
which may contravene this principle and which result in a significant saving of direct
taxes in export transactions. In such circumstances the Member shall normally at-
tempt to resolve their differences using the facilities of existing bilateral tax treaties
or other specific international mechanisms, without prejudice to the rights and obli-
gations of Members under GATT 1994, including the right of consultation created in
the preceding sentence. Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member from taking
measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income earned by its enter
prises or the enterprises of another Member.
71. In its appeal, the U.S. referred to the 1981 GATT Council action in United States Tax Legislation
(DISC), 285 GATT BISD 114 (1981), as the "1981 Understanding." The Appellate Body declined to consider
the Council action to be as formal as the reference to "1981 Understanding" implies, and instead referred to
the action as the 1981 "understanding." See Appellate Body Report, supra note 63, at n.45.
72. Appellate Body Report, supra note 63,1 25.
73. Id. (emphasis in original).
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tion from the scope of the Illustrative Last, functions "as a tax exemption measure to
avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income, the FSC measure is permitted by
footnote 59.''74
b. The 1981 "understanding"
The U.S. claims that the 1981 "understanding" resolved the disagreement between
the EEC and the U.S. over the DISC regime,75 and that it "specifically states that eco-
nomic processes located outside the territory of the exporting country 'should not be
regarded as export activities.' 76 Such characterization would be important because
"[t]he import of this language is to remove such processes from the ambit of Article
3.1 (a) and Annex 1 of the SCM Agreement, both of which deal exclusively with export
subsidies. If foreign economic processes do not constitute 'export activities,' then ex-
empting the income from such processes from taxation cannot be deemed to be an ex-
port subsidy., 77 The U.S. also argues that the 1981 "understanding" applies principles of
general applicability that have the level of a "decision" carried forward to the WTO.78
•c. The WTO is not the appropriate dispute resolution forum
The U.S. has stated that the WTO dispute resolution process may not be the best fo-
rum to adjudicate the dispute between the U.S. and the EU regarding the tax policies of
the FSC regime.79 In its appeal to the Appellate Body, the U.S. requested that the "deci-
sion of the Panel not to dismiss or defer consideration of the European Communities'
claims relating to the administrative pricing rules unless and until these rules had been
raised in an appropriate tax forum." 80 The U.S. request focused on the fourth sentence of
footnote 59, "which directs Members to resort to appropriate tax fora before invoking
WTO dispute settlement., 8'
2. Arguments by the European Communities -Appellee
It is on procedural grounds that the EU objects to the U.S. argument that the FSC
structure is a permissible measure designed to avoid double taxation: the EU argued that
the U.S. "is relying on a new 'affirmative defence,' which it did not raise before the
74. Id. 126.
75. Id. 28. The 1981 "understanding" accepted the principles codified in footnote 2 of the Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code, which "recognized that countries should take steps to avoid double taxation of foreign-source
income, and that foreign-source income should be determined on the basis of the arm's length principle." Id.
76. Id. 27.
77. Id. (emphasis in original).
78. Id. I 28, 29.
79. Comment of USTR Barshefsky, Discussion with Members and Guests of EU Committee of U.S.





Panel. ' 2 In addition, the EU objects to U.S. arguments in that neither "footnote 59 nor
the 1981 'understanding' relate to or can create such an exception." 83 The EU asserts
that the WTO dispute resolution mechanism is the appropriate forum to resolve this
dispute "because they involve export subsidies prohibited by the SCM Agreement, and
the 'alternatives' suggested by the United States are in any case inappropriate. ,84
B. The Panel Report
In short, the Panel determined that:
Viewed as an integrated whole, the exemptions provided by the FSC scheme repre-
sent a systematic effort by the United States to exempt certain types of income which
would be taxable in the absence of the FSC scheme. Thus, application of special
source rules for FSCs serves to protect a certain proportion of the foreign trade in-
come of a FSC from direct taxation, whether or not that income would be taxable un-
der the source rules provided for in Section 864 of the US Internal Revenue Code.
The exemption from the anti-deferral rules of Subpart F of the US Internal Revenue
Code ensure that the undistributed foreign trade income of a FSC is not immediately
taxable to the US parent of a FSC, even though such income might otherwise be sub-
ject to the anti-deferral rules. Finally, the 100 per cent dividends-received deduction
ensures that, even when the FSC distributes earnings attributable to foreign trade in-
come to the US parent company, the US parent will not be subject to US income taxes
on that income. Taken together, it is clear that the various exemptions under the FSC
scheme result in a situation where certain types of income are shielded from taxes that
would be due in the absence of the FSC scheme.
8 5
C. The Appellate Body Determination
In determining that the FSC structure serves as an illegal export subsidy, the Appel-
late Body agreed with the EU that the FSC rules modify the generally-prevailing U.S.
tax rules. The Appellate Body stated that the FSC tax regime "establishes three main
exemptions which affect the United States tax liability of the FSC, of its United States
supplier, and, possibly, American shareholders" '8 6 differently from how they would be
treated if not a FSC.
The first main exemption relates to Subpart F. Under traditional U.S. tax law, Sub-
part F requires that the U.S. parent of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) include in
its gross income a pro rata share of the CFC's income that has yet to be distributed to the
U.S. parent.87 This Subpart F income is taxable to the U.S. parent without deferral, re-
82. Id. 45.
83. Id. 47.
84. Id. 61 (emphasis in original).
85. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations," WT/DS 108/R (Oct. 8, 1999) (hereinafter Panel Report).
86. Appellate Body Report, supra note 63, 16.
87. 26 U.S.C. § 951(a).
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gardless of whether the parent has yet received the income. The Appellate Body deter-
mined that the FSC regime altered this general structure of U.S. tax law in that "the
foreign trade income is generally exempted from Subpart F ... [which means that] the
parent of an FSC is not required to declare its pro rata share of the undistributed income
of an FSC that is derived from the foreign trade income of the FSC and is not taxed on
such income.,
88
Second, under general U.S. tax law, the foreign source income of a foreign corpora-
tion is taxable to the extent that it is "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade
or business within the United States., 89 Traditionally, a determination whether there is a
sufficient connection with a U.S. trade or business is a factual inquiry;90 however, the
Appellate Body found that "the exempt portion of the FSC's foreign trade income is not
subject to [this] factual inquiry ... [but is] legislatively determined not to be 'effectively
connected' and, therefore, is not taxable in the hands of the FSC."9'
The Appellate Body Report also describes a third exemption regarding the taxation
of dividends. General U.S. tax law provides that dividends associated with foreign
source income are taxable when received by the U.S. corporation. 92 Again, the Appellate
Body determined that the FSC structure deviates from the typical system, in that "United
States corporate shareholders of an FSC generally may deduct 100 percent of dividends
received from distributions made out of the foreign trade income of an FSC [which
means that] the parent of an FSC is generally not taxed on dividends received that are
derived from the foreign tiade income of the FSC. 93
It is true that the FSC regime altered the traditional tax treatment of foreign income.
Tax policies of many other countries followed the "territoriality" principle and thus
"these laws did not tax income earned outside the country's territory, nor did they
impose more than a token tax on foreign earnings remitted to the home country. 9 4 The
territoriality principle is reflected in the VAT. The Internal Revenue Code of the U.S.
did not automatically allow for such export savings as the U.S. applies the
"extraterritoriality" principle, in which the U.S. imposes a tax liability on any U.S.
person, even if residing abroad. The U.S. system of income tax, where any U.S. person
incurs tax liability anywhere in the world, reflects this fundamental difference. Under
Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, "U.S. exporters were required to pay income
taxes on the export income of tax-haven subsidiaries that conducted no manufacturing in
the tax-haven country. 95 As a result of Subpart F, U.S. exporters paid more income
88. Appellate Body Report, supra note 63, 17 (emphasis in original), citing Panel Report, supra note
85,17.96. See also 26 U.S.C. § 951(e).
89. 26 U.S.C. § 882(a).
90. 26 U.S.C. § 864.
91. Appellate Body Report, supra note 63, 16 (emphasis in original).
92. See Panel Report, supra note 85, 7.97.
93. Appellate Body Report, supra note 63, 18, citing 26 U.S.C. § 245(c).
94. Hudec, supra note 62, at 1448.
95. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12, 76 Stat. 1006-27 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 951-964
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Journal of Legislation
taxes on their export income than the exporters from countries that followed the
territoriality principle.96 In that regard, the DISC and the FSC regimes could be
explained as attempts for tax parity, rather than expression of an intent to subsidize
exporting companies.
D. Decision of The Dispute Settlement Body
The Dispute Settlement Body adopted the reports of the Appellate Body and the
dispute settlement panel. The EU "expressed its satisfaction at the conclusions of the
reports, [but] the United States said that this outcome unjustifiably discriminated be-
tween Members on the basis of their tax systems. 97
VII. NEW LEGISLATION REPLACING THE FSC STRUCTURE
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky stated that the view of the U.S. "re-
mains that the FSC is completely consistent with U.S. WTO obligations. '98 Similarly,
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers stated that "[tihe FSC rules are
widely viewed as creating a level playing field with European tax systems and are im-
portant to our business community." 99 Both Ambassador Barshefsky and Secretary
Summers asserted that they would seek a compromise with the EU because "it is in
neither the interest of the U.S. nor the EU to allow this case to damage our bilateral
relationship or to impede progress on a range of U.S.-EU activities.
' 00
In fact, the U.S. and the EU did reach an agreement "regarding procedures for re-
viewing whether the ... FSC repeal and replacement legislation ... is WTO consis-
tent."101 On November 15, 2000, President Clinton signed into law H.R. 4986, the FSC
Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000 ("FSC replacement legisla-
tion"). 10 2 This law was introduced in order to implement the findings of the W O, and
passed with strong bipartisan support.'
0 3
In short, the FSC replacement legislation provides that part of the income generated
by sales outside the U.S. from goods manufactured with more than fifty percent U.S.
inputs would be tax-free. The legislation introduces a new formula for calculating the
nontax portion of extraterritorial income, and tax is paid on the remainder in the same
(1982)).
96. Hudec, supra note 62, at 1449.
97. "DSB Establishes Two New Panels, Adopts Salmon and FSC Reports," Nouvelles (Mar. 22, 2000),
available at http://www.wto.org/french/news-f/news00_f/dsbmar-f.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2001).
98. USTR Press Release, Feb. 24, 2000.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. USTR Press Release, Sept. 30, 2000.
102. See http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2001). See also "Clinton Signs Law Replacing For-
eign Sales Corporation Tax Regime," Press Release of the United States Mission to the European Union (Nov.
17, 2000).
103. See "Clinton Signs Law," supra note 102. See also USTR Press Release, Nov, 14, 2000.
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manner as the previous regime.1°4 The legislation replaces the 1984 FSC regime with
approximately $4.5 billion in tax savings over ten years.1
0 5
The FSC replacement legislation fundamentally changes the U.S. tax treatment of
extraterritorial income by excluding it from gross income to the extent that it is "qualify-
ing foreign trade income." This change moves the U.S. toward a more territorial tax
system. Qualifying foreign trade income is defined as the amount of gross income
which, if excluded, will result in a reduction of the taxable income by the greatest of: (1)
thirty percent of the "foreign sale and leasing income" derived by the taxpayer from the
transaction; (2) 1.2 percent of the "foreign trading gross receipts" derived by the tax-
payer from the transaction; or (3) fifteen percent of the "foreign trade income" derived
by the taxpayer from the transaction. 10 6 According to the Senate Report by the Commit-
tee on Finance, this exclusion of extraterritorial income "parallels the foreign-source
income excluded under most extraterritorial tax systems, particularly those employed by
the European Union member states."'
0 7
The U.S. claims that under the FSC replacement legislation, "'the general rule is
that extraterritorial income, for example income earned from foreign sales of goods, is
not subject to tax. Pursuant to this general rule, the U.S. does not forgo any revenue
otherwise due, but instead, as is our right, refrains from subjecting such income to tax in
the first place."" 10 8 Through the FSC replacement legislation, Congress purports to "treat
all foreign sales alike" by applying the general exclusion "to foreign trade income,
whether the goods are manufactured in the United States or abroad - a substantially
greater category of income than that which was exempted from tax under the FSC provi-
sions."' 9 The problem, however, is that the FSC replacement legislation still grants a
tax break from payment of direct tax based on exports. In the category of exports, the
fundamental principle is that tax breaks cannot be export-contingent. The FSC replace-
ment legislation maintains that crucial distinction, exempting only the extraterritorial
income derived from export activities, and thus is not WTO-compliant.
It does not seem that the FSC replacement legislation complies with the WTO sim-
ply because "[u]nder neither the U.S. tax system as modified by this legislation nor
many European tax systems is the income excluded from taxation limited to income
earned through exporting."" 0 The FSC replacement legislation excludes a portion of
income on the sole justification that it was earned on account of exports. The FSC re-
104. 17 ITR 1506 (BNA) Oct. 5,2000.
105. 17 ITR 1596 (BNA) Oct. 19, 2000. Note that this is slightly higher than the amount of tax revenue
that the FSC regime is estimated (by the Congressional Research Service) to cost the U.S. government. 17 1TR
1506 (BNA) Oct. 5, 2000.
106. H.R. 4986, Sec. 941.
107. Joint Comm. on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 4986, the "FSC
Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of2000," (JCX-1 11-00) Nov. 1, 2000.
108. 17 ITR 1338 (BNA) Sept. 17, 2000, quoting the Sept. 1, 2000 statement of a "senior U.S. official."




placement legislation contains a foreign requirement: "property constitutes qualifying
foreign trade property if, among other things, the property is held primarily for lease,
sale, or rental, in the ordinary course of business, for direct use, consumption, or
disposition outside of the United States.""
The FSC replacement legislation is an attempt to "ensure that the current recipients
of the FSC structure continue to enjoy the same level of benefits as before, without ad-
dressing aspects of the existing FSC system that violate WTO export subsidy rules."
'' 1 2
Certainly, the FSC replacement legislation does not change the defining characteristics
of an FSC. In order to enjoy these tax savings, the entity must be a foreign corporation
set up by a U.S. parent to handle the export activities of the parent that must have a
genuine foreign presence and earn income attributable to substantial commercial activity
outside the U.S. Similarly, no foreign tax credit is allowed for income paid with respect
to the excluded extraterritorial income and the FSC must adhere to traditional arm's
length pricing guidelines under Section 482 or one of the two administrative rules. The
only apparent change is that rather than allow a tax deferral or exemption of a portion of
foreign trade income, the FSC replacement legislation now simply does not include this
income in gross income in the first place. The U.S. is on shaky ground.
The FSC replacement legislation attempts to reconcile the Appellate Body's prohi-
bition on giving back direct taxes through exemptions or indefinite deferrals. Not
including a portion of the income affiliated with export activities from income tax liabil-
ity, however, is the functional and literal equivalent, of exempting or indefinitely defer-
ring the same amount. The formula for calculating the exempted income differs between
the two enactments, but the result is indistinguishable. Although the legislation "funda-
mentally changes" the general U.S. tax regime by excluding extraterritorial income, it
only excludes a portion of specific extraterritorial income - that income derived from
exports. U.S. entities abroad earn income from activities other than export-related activi-
ties. Yet, under this legislation, such "extraterritorial" income would be taxed as usual.
This inconsistency will be the legislation's undoing before the WTO. As the GATT
panel ruled that the DISC structure violated GATT obligations and as the WTO Appel-
late Body determined that the FSC regime does not comply with WTO obligations, the
FSC replacement legislation also "serves to protect a certain proportion of the foreign
trade income of a FSC from direct taxation." 113 Thus, U.S. efforts to cushion the differ-
ential impact of income tax with the rest of the world's VAT has not found an accept-
able solution.
Functionally, the FSC replacement legislation approximates the VAT in that ex-
porters do not pay taxes because the goods do not remain for consumption in the export-
ing country. However, the FSC replacement legislation does not comply with Article
XVI of the GATT since it excludes a portion of direct tax from tax liability. It is
111. Id.
112. 17 ITR 1338 (BNA) (Sept 17, 2000).
113. Panel Report, supra note 85, 7.92.
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unlikely that the U.S. will be able to modify its existing tax regime to achieve tax incen-
tives for exporters and to comply with WTO requirements as long as (1) the U.S. main-
tains its direct, extraterritorial system or (2) the WTO does away with the distinction
between direct and indirect taxation.
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